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Abstract
Very often in the history of mankind, social changes took place because a minority was successful in
persuading the dominant majority of a new idea. Social psychology provides empirically well-founded
theories of social influence that can explain the power of minorities at individual level. In this
contribution, we present an agent-based computer simulation of one such theory, the Elaboration
Likelihood Model (ELM). After introducing the theoretical background and our agent model, we present
three simulation experiments that confirm past laboratory research but also go beyond its findings by
adopting the method of computer simulation. First, we found that even a minority with low argument
quality can be successful as long as it has positive peripheral cues. Second, our results suggest that a
higher personal relevance of a topic for the majority led it to be more receptive to minority influence only
when the minority showed neutral peripheral cues and very good arguments. Third, we found evidence
that a neutral or only slightly biased majority is influenced more easily than a strongly biased one. To
sum up, we consider these results to illustrate the notion that a well-presented, comprehensible and
valid computer simulation provides a useful tool for theory development and application in an
exploratory manner as long as it is well founded in terms of the model and theory.
Keywords:
Social Influences, Persuasion Processes, Group Processes, Minority Influence, Computer Simulation,
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 Introduction
1.1
A group of people does not always agree unanimously on a topic. If attitudes are not distributed equally
among the members of the group, a minority and a majority are created. A minority is defined as a group
lacking power, status, competence, or just an adequate number of group members. When such
disagreement arises in a group, it is experienced as undesirable, as a tension and a threat. Such
disagreements also lead an individual to doubt his or her own beliefs and reduce confidence in him or
herself and in stable frames of reference, which makes the individual reconsider a given topic.
1.2
Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme and Blackstone (1994), in a review of 97 studies, found that
minorities may exert influence over majority recipients and that this impact tends to vary with the type
of influence assessed. Basically, there are two main ways for a minority to influence a majority: they may07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
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use convincing arguments regarding the topic at hand or else use those implicit, stylistic features of their
endeavours which are generally called peripheral cues (Moscovici 1980).
1.3
We will model the social influence of minorities in order to illustrate the advantage of using social
psychology theories when simulating social behaviour. Social influence is a daily component of
interactions between individuals. It consists of a variety of changes in physiological states and subjective
feelings, motives and emotions, cognitions and beliefs, values and behaviour that occur in an individual
as a result of the real, implied or imagined presence or actions of another individual (Latané 1981). In
this paper we focus on the change of attitudes in groups consisting of a majority and a minority.
1.4
In recent years, the social sciences have embraced simulation techniques as a new and powerful tool for
exploring the dynamics of social systems. Often, very simple agent rules are used in simulation models.
This is a fruitful approach for exploring the minimal conditions under which certain phenomena become
manifest. However, the mimicking of behaviour in a social system does not always yield knowledge that
has a clear link to real-world social dynamics. A modeller planning the rules for building agents may be
predisposed to a biased view since the rules he or she develops will make sense from his or her personal
perspective on the issue at hand. But if a tested theory is used as the basis of the agent model, a certain
objectivity can be guaranteed.
1.5
Social psychology theories may provide valuable insights that may fundamentally improve the
architecture of agents. The goal of the present study is to show that simulation of these theories leads
to results that are very close to those obtained in laboratory experiments with human participants and
that new hypotheses can be derived from simulation experiments.
1.6
In the following sections of the introduction, we review relevant literature on minority influence and
present the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), a social psychology theory formulated by Petty and
Cacioppo (1986) that has the proven capacity to explain group processes related to persuasion and
decision-making, and therefore also minority influence. We then proceed to our methods by introducing
our agent model based on the ELM and present results of three simulated group experiments with a
multi-agent simulation. We conclude by discussing our findings in the light of social psychological
theory and the agent-based modelling methodology.
 Theoretical Background
2.1
Minorities are often divided into two basic types that have different positions and possibilities to apply
influence. Out-group minorities differ from the majority not only in the position they advocate but also in
their membership of a social category, for example skin colour, racial background, or gender. In-group
minorities on the other hand differ only by their opinion from the rest of the group. Different theories
explain how a minority may be more or less successful in influencing the majority. In the following, we
will present some of them, in particular the ELM model, which represents the basis of our agent model.
2.2
According to Moscovici (1980) in his two-process model of conversion and conformity, minorities are
successful because they are different. The minority thus induces a private process in each member of
the majority, who may still officially proclaim the majority's attitude but has privately changed his or her
opinion (i.e. conversion). On the other hand, the majority almost compels its members to conform to the
official attitude of the majority (i.e. conformity).
2.3
Self-categorisation theory (Turner 1991), in contrast, assumes that minorities are successful because they
are similar to the majority. It postulates that humans only expect to have the same opinion as others
when these individuals appear similar to themselves. A deviant opinion of a group that is perceived as
similar destroys expectations and produces insecurity. In order to reduce this insecurity, the individual
can re-categorise the group or him/herself, or can change his/her attitude, and this is where social
influence takes place.
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Research has shown that minorities that are not only different because of their opinion but also because
of their social category generally have a harder time convincing the majority of their opinion (seeMaass
and Clark 1984). This phenomenon is explained by the fact that an in-group minority and the majority
share a consensually similar assessment of reality, whereas the out-group minority does not (Turner
1991). Recent laboratory research generally uses double minorities, where for example white or
heterosexual subjects are confronted with differing opinions of blacks or homosexuals (e.g.Petty,
Fleming and White 1999).
2.5
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) provides a clearly formulated
theoretical reference system designed to organise, categorise, and understand the underlying processes
of persuasive communication (seeStahlberg and Frey 1993). The observation that the stability of
attitudes and the predictability of behaviour based on these attitudes can vary widely led the authors to
develop the idea that there are different ways of influencing attitudes. The ELM distinguishes two basic
ways of attitude formation.
2.6
The first is the central route, which is used when the person is motivated and able to treat information
and arguments cognitively. The likelihood of cognitive elaboration increases with a person's increasing
motivation and ability to evaluate the communication presented.
2.7
The second option is the peripheral route, which is on the other side of the elaboration continuum.
When elaboration is low, people engage in less thoughtful analyses of arguments or take their
orientation from peripheral cues, such as the trustworthiness of the source, sympathy, number of
arguments or argument length and many more. As long as processing is superficial, argument quality
will have little effect and attitude change will be determined mostly by peripheral cues.
2.8
When the individual has no prior opinion regarding the issue at hand, he or she remains objective and
recognizes good or bad arguments as such and is able to treat them accordingly. However, where the
individual is biased toward or against a topic, the cognitive processing of the information is also
influenced. The individual will then treat the information received in such a way that it does not
contradict his or her preconceived opinion.
2.9
Faced with a positively biased person (i.e. in favour of one's own opinion), even low-quality arguments
and slightly negative peripheral cues will be effective because the person evaluates them more positively
in order to fit them into his or her preconceived attitude. On the other hand, attempting to influence a
negatively biased person (i.e. predisposed against one's own opinion) is all the harder, because all
arguments and peripheral cues will be devalued and the recipient of the influence will react with
counter-arguments and negative thoughts.
2.10
The motivation to treat information centrally depends on several factors, including the personal
relevance of a topic, because the more involved a person is in the topic the readier he or she is to
expend the energy and time necessary to treat the issue cognitively. Generally it can be said that attitude
changes resulting mainly from central processing will show greater temporal persistence, greater
prediction of behaviour, and stronger resistance to counter-arguments than attitude changes resulting
mainly from peripheral processing.
 The Agent Model
3.1
As mentioned above, the agent model is based on a theory of social psychology by Petty and Cacioppo
(1986) known as the Elaboration Likelihood Model, which explains the information processing inside an
individual. The rules for each process inside the agent were derived from the ELM's seven core
statements (seeMosler, Ammann and Gutscher 1998). Given that the simulation is based on laboratory
experiments, the direction of the influence is inferred easily and the parameters for the transition
functions can also be deduced.
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The agent model is shown in Figure 1. It reduces the complexity of the theoretical knowledge and the
empirical findings that we have of the Elaboration Likelihood Model to a comprehensible extent, and only
the most important and most thoroughly tested variables were used to generate the different types of
elaboration. Certain aspects were also summarised in a more general construct. The variable 'peripheral
cues', for example, stands for source expertise, but also for credibility and further peripheral cues.
Following the conventions of systems theory (seeBischof 1995), variables are represented as arrows
showing the direction of their effects. The blocks contain the transition functions in which the entry
variables are computed to obtain the exit variable.
Figure 1. Block diagram of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). The variables
are labelled on the arrows. The transition functions are found in the numbered yellow blocks and
explained in the text
3.3
The dimensions of all variables lie between 0 and 10. We distinguish one and two-poled variables. One-
poled variables represent one-dimensional concepts such as personal relevance, distraction, elaboration
motivation, elaboration ability and elaboration likelihood. The values of the one-poled variables are
minimal at 0 and maximal at 10. Two-poled variables represent two-dimensional concepts such as
attitude, value orientation, peripheral cues, argument quality and bias position. They have a point of
indifference at 5 (e.g. no particular attitude towards a certain issue), whereas 10 and 0 represent an
extremely positive and extremely negative value respectively (e.g. an extreme attitude for or against a
certain issue). The scales of the model variables used in the present research are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Scaling of independent and dependent variables in alphabetical order
indicating the terminology used in this paper
V a r i a b l e  /  S c a l e 0 1234 5 6789 1 0
(Source) Argument Quality Low Indifferent High
(Source) Attitude Disagreement Neutral Agreement
Bias Position Negative bias Neutral Positive bias
Distraction None Maximum
Elaboration Ability None Maximum07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
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Elaboration Likelihood Low High
Elaboration Motivation None Maximum
Knowledge None Maximum
Peripheral Cue Negative Indifferent Positive
Personal Relevance None Indifferent Maximum
Value Orientation Disagreement Neutral Agreement
3.4
The following treatment describes the transition functions for each block of the model (see alsoMosler,
Schwarz, Ammann, and Gutscher 2001). The algorithms for the computer program were designed in
accordance with the preceding formulations of the relating functions. When processing the model, the
temporary values of the variables are rounded off but analyses showed that the number of digits on the
right-hand side of the comma made no qualitative difference to the model's outcome.
3.5
Block 1: Elaboration motivation is determined by personal relevance. With increasing personal relevance,
the agent's motivation to process arguments increases (see Equation 1). Personal relevance stands for all
variables that can influence elaboration motivation (e.g. self-responsibility, need for cognition).
Elaboration motivation = Personal relevance (1)
3.6
Block 2: Elaboration ability is determined by knowledge and distraction. Knowledge stands for objective
knowledge as an ability-promoting variable (Petty, Priester, and Wegener 1994;Wood, Rhodes, and Biek
1995). Increasing distraction reduces the ability-promoting effect of knowledge (see Equation 2).
Elaboration ability = Knowledge  {1 - (distraction / 10)} (2)
3.7
Block 3: A variable known as the 'intrinsic elaboration likelihood' (IEL) is calculated by multiplying the
variables 'elaboration motivation' and 'elaboration ability' (see Equation 3a). This multiplicative relation
ensures that no elaboration takes place when either motivation or ability equal zero. For example,
arguments presented in an unknown foreign language cannot be processed even in the presence of
motivation, because the person lacks the ability to do so. The elaboration likelihood (EL) is further
influenced by the peripheral cue of the communication source. A highly positive peripheral cue has an
enhancing effect, while a very negative one has a reducing effect on the elaboration likelihood. This
influence is at its maximum with moderate values of elaboration likelihood and decreases continuously
at both higher and lower values (see Equation 3b).
IEL = (Elaboration Motivation * Elaboration Ability) 0.5 (3a)
EL = IEL + {[(peripheral cue - 5) / 2] * [1 - |IEL - 5| / 5]} (3b)
3.8
Block 4: A bias position is calculated from the attitude and value orientation of the agent. The formula
considers the direction of the bias as well as the amount of bias (see Equation 4). Bias refers not only to
an agent's attitude position, but also to the person's underlying value orientation (Johnson and Eagly
1989). The value orientation stands for all variables that can produce bias (e.g. prior knowledge, prior
warnings) and may of course also include peripheral cues, such as the mood and expertise of the
source.
Bias position = (Attitude + Value orientation) / 2 (4)
3.9
Block 5: The central factor is made up of both objective (i.e. source-argument quality [SAQ]) and biased
(i.e. bias position [BP]) processing (see Equation 5). Strong arguments bring about attitude change in the
intended direction, whereas weak arguments have a counterproductive effect (seePetty and Cacioppo
1994, p. 70). Biased processing manifests itself in such a manner that a bias factor overlays objective07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
Page 6 of 18 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/9/3/4.html
processing. When the bias position of the agent and the attitude advocated by the source are both either
favourable or unfavourable, the central factor is increased by the bias factor in accordance with the
argument quality of the source. When the positions of the agent and source diverge, the bias factor has a
reducing effect on the central factor. How strongly the central factor will be overlaid by the bias factor
depends upon the bias position of the agent. If this is moderate, the bias strength is minimal, but it
increases continuously both up and down from the midpoint. Thus the more extreme the bias position,
the more strongly will the agent counter-argue communications opposing his or her position and
cognitively bolster congruent messages (Petty and Cacioppo 1986b).
Central factor = [(SAQ - 5) / 2.5] + {[(5 - SAQ) / 5 + d] * (|BP - 5| / 5) 2}
where d = +2, if (BP  5 and source attitude  5) or if (BP  5 and source attitude  5)
where d = -2, if (BP > 5 and source attitude < 5) or if (BP < 5 and source attitude > 5)
(5)
3.10
Block 6: The peripheral factor gains a positive value through a highly positive peripheral cue of the
source, while a very negative peripheral cue results in a negative value (see Equation 6). The parameter
1.65 has been estimated through sensitivity analyses.
Peripheral factor = (peripheral cue) / 1.65 (6)
3.11
Block 7: An agent's attitude after persuasion results from the sum of the previously held attitude
(attitudet-1; t-1 = prior to persuasion) and the attitude change generated by the persuasion. For the
attitude change, the difference is first calculated between the source's attitude (SA) and the agent's
attitudes (IA). At this point, the attitude difference expresses the extent and direction of the attitude
change (see Equation 7). The ultimate modification of the attitude is then calculated on the basis of the
computation of the central factor (CF) and the peripheral factor (PF).
3.12
For example, assuming that an agent's elaboration likelihood (EL) reaches a value of 8, 80% of his or her
attitude change will be determined to by the central factor and 20% of it by the peripheral factor because
the agent will treat the information more centrally than peripherally. The more central the agent's
processing of the information, the less peripheral it is, since these two factors demonstrate additive
interference.
IA = IAt-1 + [(SA — IAt-1) / 3] * {[(EL / 10) * CF] + [(1 — EL / 10) * PF]} (7)
3.13
Block 8: This block introduces a change of argument quality (AQ) in the recipient of the communication
in relation to his/her processing of the source's arguments (see Equation 8c). The arguments of the
source become integrated into one's own argumentation depending on the degree of elaboration. The
calculation of argument quality, changed by persuasion, is performed in analogy to that of attitude
change. Proportionately to the elaboration likelihood (EL), a central portion (CP) and a peripheral portion
(PP) of the treatment of the source's arguments are added to the prior argument quality (AQ t-1). The
central portion increases the agent's argument quality only when the source's argument quality (SAQ) is
higher than that of the agent (see Equation 8b). Even if peripheral processing dominates, there can still
be a change in the agent's argument quality, because central processing is clearly never completely
absent. The agent's argument quality cannot only be enhanced by the peripheral portion, it may also be
reduced if the source's argument quality is low (see Equation 8a).
PP = (SAQ — AQt-1) / 10 (8a)
CP = (SAQ — AQ t-1) / 10 (8b)
AQ = AQt-1 + [(EL / 10) * CP] + [(1 — EL / 10) * PP] (8c)
3.14
Block 9: Our model assumes that there is a relationship between argument quality and an agent's
knowledge. This assumption represents an extension of the ELM and is based on a statement by Petty
and Cacioppo (1986) that the agent's prior knowledge guards against persuasive messages. This means07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
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that agents develop their arguments based on their prior knowledge, which leads us to conclude that the
agent's argumentation scheme is integrated into his or her knowledge (similar considerations are found
in Petty et al. 1994).
Knowledge = Argument quality (9)
3.15
Validation of a computer simulation model is principally concerned with the comparison of the
simulation model with the reality. Since the present model is based on a theory of social psychology that
has been validated in turn by laboratory research, the experimental settings of published studies are
translated and entered into the simulation. The simulation results are compared to the original study
findings (Whicker and Sigelman 1991) and the various elaboration processes of the ELM are compared
with empirical findings. To be valid, the model must replicate the findings from the research performed
with individuals. However, complete quantitative replication is not possible because information on
certain variables will be missing in any given study. Potential measurement errors must also be taken
into consideration. Replication of a study by the simulation model is considered successful if the pattern
of original findings can be replicated.
3.16
Mosler et al. (2001) carried out detailed validations of the presented model. They showed that several
studies on attitude change based on the ELM can be replicated using the simulation model. In their
paper, the authors conclude that the model can be justifiably assumed to adequately represent the
processes described in the ELM, i.e. the agents react as real human beings to stimuli in certain settings.
Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis has shown that the model's outcome does not change qualitatively
when the parameters in the equations are varied to a modest degree.
 Simulation Experiments
4.1
The simulated group consisted of five agents, all of which are described by the agent model described
above (see Figure 1). Each agent receives three social and three internal input variables. The social input
variables are obtained from the source of the persuasion; these are peripheral cues, source argument
quality, and source attitude. The three internal input variables that describe the agent's original state
are: personal relevance, distraction and value orientation. After the processing inside the agent is
completed, three output variables are emitted which influence the next agent as external input variables,
namely source argument quality, source attitude and peripheral cues. The last of these is unaffected by
the processing and was therefore constant.
4.2
The agents interact sequentially, i.e. only one agent influences all the others at any time. Social influence
is achieved by using the output values (attitude, argument quality and peripheral cues) of an agent, for
example A (A1 in Figure 2), as the values for the input variables of the other agents. Their output values
are determined according to the model (B1 turns into B2, C1 into C2, etc.). The new output values of
agent B (B2) then become the input values for the other agents and so on. At the end of a round of
persuasion, every agent has influenced all the others once. This is comparable to a group discussion in
which every participant is allowed to speak in turn and every participant is heard once. Each person
starts with certain arguments and a position regarding the topic being discussed. Eventually, through the
discussion with the other participants, the agent's attitude may change and this shift will be
communicated to the other agents in the next round until the end of the experiment.07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
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Figure 2. Sequence of social influence in a group of five agents (A, B, C, D, and E). Red arrows
represent social influence. Black arrows represent transitions of agent states (e.g. attitudes)
4.3
In order to initialize the simulation, certain variables need to be given starting values. Because the study
looks at the influence of minorities, the five agents are divided into two unequal groups. Each group is
entirely homogeneous in order to maintain a clear difference between the majority and the minority. This
means that all members of a group, be it the majority or the minority, are assigned the same starting
values. It would certainly be closer to reality to have each agent start with different values, but this leads
to difficulties when trying to explain the results.
4.4
The ELM agent-based model was transposed into a computer program, written using the THINK PASCAL
4.0 language on a Macintosh operating system. Each simulation experiment consisted of 20 runs. This
number was chosen because as a rule there are no further unexpected about-turns or changes in
attitude of the members of a group after 20 runs. In fact, after 20 runs the groups almost always have
either exactly the same or a maximally different attitude, which allows the experimenter to observe
clearly how successful the minority influence was.
4.5
Three simulation experiments are carried out in this paper, the minority's argument quality and peripheral
cues being independent variables in each one. In the model, however, they appear as a constant that is
not influenced by the processes taking place inside the agent according to the ELM model. This
manipulation is necessary to obtain different situations in which to observe their respective weight in the
minority's influence. On top of the two independent variables that are always modified, there are other
variables according to the objective of each simulation experiment.
4.6
The change in the majority's attitude calculated between its starting value and the value at the end of the
persuasion effort is used as the dependent variable. This change allows the success of the minority in its
quest to convince the majority of their attitude to be estimated. In the following, we present the design
of each of the three simulation experiments and the respective results.
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4.7
For the first simulation experiment, the objective is to observe the influence of argument quality as well
as peripheral cues on the persuasion attempt by the minority. On the basis of the theory of the ELM it is
to be expected that a high argument quality in combination with strongly positive peripheral cues will
lead to the greatest success by the minority. As an additional aspect, the ratio between the minority and
the majority is also manipulated. In one condition, the simulation experiment is carried out with one
member in the minority and four agents as part of the majority, in another condition of the experiment
the proportion is two to three. We expect the larger minority to be better at influencing the majority,
since more agents will be promoting the minority's attitude.
4.8
In line with the study goals mentioned above, the design of the first simulation experiment consists of
three manipulated factors: The minority's argument quality has five levels (1, 3, 5, 7, 9), the minority's
peripheral cue also has five levels (1, 3, 5, 7, 9), and the minority/majority ratio has two levels (one to four
vs. two to three). This results in an experimental design with 50 cells (5  5  2). Furthermore, the
minority has an initial attitude of eight and initial personal values of eight whereas all starting values are
set to five for the majority. The results for a one-person minority in Table 2 show two clearly different
reaction patterns of the majority.
4.9
If the peripheral cues of the minority are negative or neutral, and if they coincide with a low argument
quality, the distance between the attitude of the majority and that of the minority increases (see green
cells in Table 2). This distance is a maximum (= -5) in all conditions with one exception (= -2.9).
Furthermore, the minority's attitude has also changed from 8 to 10 in these conditions (not shown in
Table 2). This is known as bipolarisation and occurs because the two groups process their data in a biased
way.
4.10
The second general reaction pattern occurs when the peripheral cue is positive, very positive or neutral,
and when it coincides with high or very high argument quality (yellow cells in Table 2). After 20 runs of
the experiment, all five members of the group have the same attitude that lies somewhere between the
original attitude of the minority (=8) and that of the majority (=5). This pattern is similar to consensus
building efforts between a majority and a minority. The minority has successfully influenced the majority,
since the new attitude of the majority is closer to that of the minority than the original attitude was.
Table 2. Attitude change (attitude at the end — attitude at the beginning [= 5]) of the majority in
simulation experiment 1 with a minority/majority ratio of one to four. The green cells represent
conditions where bipolarisation has occurred, the yellow cells represent conditions where a consensus
has occurred
4.11
Table 3 shows the results from the same experimental settings as Table 2 above, with the difference that
the ratio between the minority and the majority is two to three. Thus the influence of the minority was07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
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significantly higher than in the situation where there was only one member of the minority and four
members of the majority.
4.12
Under certain circumstances, strong bipolarisation took place in both settings. Some conditions (see
green cells) show that the minority has no way of persuading the majority if it has negative peripheral
cues. Instead of persuasion, the contrary occurs, namely the minority causes the majority to reject their
attitude and to distance itself even further. The same situation occurs when the minority has neutral
peripheral cues but low argument quality.
Table 3. Attitude change (attitude at the end — attitude at the beginning [= 5]) of the majority in
simulation experiment 1 with a minority/majority ratio of two to three. The green cells represent
conditions where bipolarisation occurred, the yellow cells represent conditions where consensus
occurred
Simulation Experiment 2 — Varying Processing Depth
4.13
In the second simulation experiment, the goal is to study the influence of the depth of processing so
that the variable of 'personal relevance' is manipulated. According to Petty and Cacioppo (1986), the
processing depth determines whether the central or peripheral route is taken to treat the information
received from a source. When the processing is deep, the information is treated cognitively or centrally
by the agent, who will be more interested in arguments than in peripheral clues. In contrast, when the
processing depth is shallow, the agent is more easily influenced by peripheral cues, not wishing to
invest a lot of energy in the cognitive processing of the information. Personal relevance influences the
depth of processing, since the more important an issue is to the agent the readier he or she is to invest
time and energy in considering the topic cognitively. The results of the present experiment are expected
to show that the higher the personal relevance and consequently the more important the depth of
processing, the more successful is a minority with a high argument quality. When the processing depth
is shallow, peripheral cues become more successful than arguments at convincing the majority. The
design of the second simulation experiment is identical to that of the first experiment, with the following
exceptions: The personal relevance of both the minority and the majority has three levels in each case:
low (=2), medium (=5), and strong (=8). The argument quality and peripheral cues were only neutral
(=5), positive (=7) or highly positive (=9). This results in an experimental design with 81 cells (3  3  3
 3). The minority/majority ratio was one to four as in the first condition of the first simulation
experiment.
Table 4. Attitude change of the majority in simulation experiment 2. The coloured or framed cells are
referred to in the text07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
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4.14
Our expectation that a higher personal relevance of the majority and therefore greater depth of
processing lead to a more successful influence by a minority using arguments is not fully substantiated
in the results (see Table 4). A significant incidence between a high personal relevance of the majority and
a positive influence by the minority only occurs when the peripheral cues of the minority are neutral with
a value of 5 (see the yellow coloured cells in Table 4, for example).
4.15
If the minority's peripheral cue is positive or even highly positive, a higher personal relevance of the
majority has a negative influence on the success of the minority in persuading the majority. The higher
the personal relevance of the majority, the less it is influenced by the minority (for peripheral cues at 7,
see the green coloured cells, for example — for peripheral cues at 9, see the blue coloured cells in Table
4).
4.16
This negative outcome is all the more important the lower the minority's argument quality (see the
variations of argument quality in orange cells of Table 4, for example). When the minority's argument
quality is high and its peripheral cues are positive or highly positive, the degree of personal relevance of
the majority hardly influences the success of the minority at all (compare the pink coloured cells in Table
4, for example).
4.17
Given that every single experiment consists of 20 runs, the evolution of the attitude can also be recorded
at each step instead of only looking at the change between the initial and final attitude. Figure 3 shows
the evolution of the attitude over the course of two conditions (see the two cells with red frames in Table07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
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4), indicating the attitude of both majority and minority in each case. Figure 3 permits a closer look at
why a minority that has a low personal relevance is more successful at influencing the majority.
4.18
The majority's final attitude is closer to that of the minority when the latter has a high personal relevance
than when it has a low one. Looking at the evolution of the minority attitude, it becomes clear that the
minority with a high personal relevance is already influenced more strongly by the majority in the first
round of persuasion. This minority, due to its high personal relevance, treats the information received
from the majority in greater depth and is therefore influenced more strongly. This, in turn, reduces the
minority's success at convincing the majority of its own standpoint because the minority's attitude has
already become closer to that of the majority.
Figure 3. Development of attitudes in the two conditions with red-framed cells in Table 4. The two
conditions are identical with the exception of the personal relevance of the minority (high vs. low)
Simulation Experiment 3 — Varying Bias Positions of the Majority
4.19
In the third and last simulation experiment, the objective is to gain some insight into the importance of a
positive or negative bias position prior to persuasion. This means that the agents will have preconceived
attitudes toward the issue at hand before any persuasion attempts take place. If this biased attitude is
negative, it should be more difficult to influence them than if their attitude is positive.
4.20
In research with stigmatized minorities (for example Petty et al. 1999), a biased attitude of a majority
regarding a minority is studied. A common example is the biased attitude of whites or heterosexuals
towards blacks or homosexuals. These groups can also be called out-groups since they do not only differ
from the majority in their opinions but also in other aspects.
4.21
A positively biased attitude will lead the majority to appreciate the value of minority arguments and to
have more positive thoughts and associations in connection with them. If the majority is negatively
biased toward the source, it will be more critical of its arguments and will react with negative thoughts
and the formulation of counter-arguments (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). It is to be expected that a07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
Page 13 of 18 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/9/3/4.html
negatively biased majority would be less receptive to influence by the minority than a neutral or
positively biased one.
4.22
The bias position is determined in the model by the average of attitude and personal values. Since the
attitude is the relevant dependent variable, it is better to keep its value stable. Therefore, the majority's
personal values will vary between 0, 4, and 8 whilst the starting value of the attitude is slightly negative
(=4). The minority's argument quality and peripheral cues vary between 3, 5, 7, and 9. This leads to an
experimental design with 48 cells (3  4  4). The minority's attitude starts at 8 and the minority's
personal values are also set to 8. All other variables are set constant to 5 and the minority/majority ratio
is again one to four.
4.23
On the basis of these initial settings, the simulation allows the influence of a biased attitude of the
majority on the success of a minority influence to be studied. Table 5 shows three experiments in each
column that are identical with the exception of the bias position of the majority. According to the
hypothesis that a negative bias position of the majority makes it more difficult for a minority to convince
it of their attitude, the effect should become smaller down the column as the bias becomes more
positive. Table 5 shows the overall change in attitude after a totality of 20 runs.
Table 5. Average change of majority attitude in simulation experiment 3
4.24
The results in most conditions accord with our expectations. Some, however, fail to conform. Exceptions
are the conditions with coloured cells in Table 5. Here, a slightly negative bias position of the majority
(see yellow coloured cell in Table 5) leads to a slightly more successful influence by the minority than a07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
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clearly positive bias (see green coloured cell in Table 5).
4.25
To explain this phenomenon, the evolution of the attitudes in these two conditions is depicted in Figure
4. In both experiments, the minority attitude shows a rise to a value of 10. Such a biased reaction by the
minority is present in every first round of this experimental plan, since the minority starts with a value of
8 and is negatively biased toward the attitude of the majority (4). The positively biased majority
approaches the minority more strongly than the slightly negatively biased one. This means that the
minority is more easily convinced by the majority in the first case, whereas it maintains its own attitude
longer in the second case, and is therefore more successful at convincing the majority.
Figure 4. Development of minority and majority attitudes with a slightly negative bias position of the
majority and a positive bias position of the majority
 Discussion
5.1
The first simulation experiment studying the effect of peripheral cues and argument quality on the
influence of a minority yielded very interesting results. Contrary to the expectation that a high argument
quality will be most important, positive peripheral cues turned out to be central. Even a minority with a
low argument quality can be successful as long as it has positive peripheral cues. Negative peripheral
cues of a minority mean that the minority is not only different in its opinions but also in its external
attributes.
5.2
In the literature, such a double difference defines an out-group (Petty et al. 1994). The results of our
simulations coincide with Clark and Maass (1984) who have shown that out-group minorities are less
successful in persuading a majority than in-group minorities that only differ from the majority in their
attitude. Given that the majority originally has a neutral attitude in our starting values, it has no
motivation to defend its own opinion or to treat counter-arguments centrally, so that the peripheral
route becomes all the more important (Crano and Hannula-Bral 1994). The over-estimation of the
importance of peripheral cues may be in part attributable to the starting values, but the results
nonetheless suggest that the minority's external attributes are considered first in order to decide
whether the arguments will be heard or not.07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
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5.3
Another aspect of the first simulation was the influence of a two-person minority instead of one with a
single member. The expectation that a larger minority will be more successful was confirmed. The
reaction by the majority was always stronger to the persuasive efforts of the two-member minority. If
the persuasion was successful, the attitude at the end was closer to the minority attitude than when only
one minority member attempted the persuasion. However, when the reaction of the majority was
negative, the end result was more negative for the two-member minority. It seems that if the majority
was bothered by the opinion of the minority, having two members defend this opinion made matters
worse. These results coincide with those found by Latané (1981) or Tanford and Penrod (1984) in their
laboratory experiments.
5.4
The results of the effects of personal relevance on minority influence are only partly in keeping with the
hypothesis. A higher personal relevance for the majority only led it to be more receptive to influence
when the minority showed neutral peripheral cues and good or very good arguments. It seems that these
attributes allow a minority to influence a majority that treats the information centrally. As predicted by
Petty and Cacioppo (1986), the influence of the minority is reduced when the topic has a high personal
relevance for the majority. A second finding was that a minority is more successful when the topic is not
personally relevant to it. This is due to the fact that the majority then manages to influence the minority
to a greater degree before the minority can influence the majority, which in turn reduces its success.
5.5
The expectation was that the more negatively biased a majority is, the less it is open to persuasion by
the minority. The majority in the simulation often does not behave synchronically and reacts more slowly
when negatively biased, which leads to results that are slightly different from those found in the
literature. This is, in part, due to the method used and the order in which members were allowed to
influence others. The results do show, however, that in general a neutral or only slightly biased majority
is influenced more easily than a strongly biased one. The attitude of a minority with negative peripheral
cues is always rejected, even by a positively biased majority. A minority's low argument quality alone
does not suffice for rejection by the majority, unless it also has negative peripheral cues.
5.6
As regards personal relevance, the results confirm the postulates of the ELM theory (Petty and Cacioppo
1986). In the case of a topic with high personal relevance for the majority, the minority needs to produce
arguments of high quality in order to be successful. When both peripheral cues and argument quality are
high, almost no differences are observed in successful persuasion under different degrees of personal
relevance. This suggests a confirmation of the postulate proposed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), which
predicts a co-presence of both central and peripheral routes in the processing of information at any
time.
5.7
The influence of a minority on a majority with a biased attitude is not unequivocal. It is not quite clear
whether external attributes or arguments are more successful at influencing a biased majority. After the
first round of persuasion, the findings correspond to the hypotheses of the ELM, as they do in laboratory
experiments. The results of later rounds, however, are not consistent. This deviation from traditional
theory suggests a more dynamic process, and several rounds of persuasion may in fact create a different
situation where the results are not equivocal. This may be an interesting topic to pursue further with
simulations as well as laboratory research, which has so far used only a single cycle of persuasion.
5.8
The results obtained in the different simulations show that in general out-group minorities are less
successful than those that differ from the majority only by their opinion but are otherwise similar. In
their meta-analysis of 97 studies on minority influence, Wood et al. (1994) found that individuals not
only want to be similar to attractive (in-group) minorities, but that they also perceive a normative
pressure to differentiate themselves from minorities with a low social status (out-group). The lower the
status, the stronger is the incentive to be distanced from the group. The meta-analysis concludes that
the behavioural style of a minority is a key factor in its success, which is what we also observed in our
results.
5.9
Self-categorisation theory (Turner 1991) postulates that the peripheral cues of a minority determine a07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
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successful minority influence. A minority seen as similar to the majority exerts normative pressure,
whereas a dissimilar minority does not. The results of this simulation study suggest that the success of a
minority at persuading a majority depends considerably on their peripheral cues. This conclusion
contradicts Moscovici's (1980) theory that minorities are successful because they are different. It seems
that more similar minorities, i.e. those with high peripheral cues, are more successful at influencing a
majority.
 Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions
6.1
The research presented here shows that the simulation of a theory of social psychology that explains the
social influence by a minority, namely the Elaboration Likelihood Model, yields valid results. The agents
in the simulation demonstrate similar behaviours to those of human beings in laboratory experiments
carried out in the past. The results of the simulation often reproduce similar outcomes to those in real
situations. The results obtained can be explained by the internal processes of the agents which are
observable thanks to the simulation. This shows that theory-guided modelling is closer to the reality
because the theories are based on real findings and the results are consequently also more applicable to
reality. It is an advantage to use theories for simulation because it is easier to test their validity by using
existing data from laboratory research to test the computer model. Validity is very important and often
neglected in social simulation (van Dijkum, de Tombe and van Kuijk 1999).
6.2
Simulations also help to advance theories, so that a need for formalisation helps develop a theory, for
example. Specifications and possibly also extensions in the simulation framework can then be tested by
traditional methods such as laboratory experiments. Another advantage of using theories is that they
generally integrate many findings and are quite general, which means that tried and tested theories are
rich in implications. This means that theory-based simulations can also reveal the most diverse
implications. Finally, theory-guided knowledge and modelling of the 'inner' workings of the individual
allow processes of social influence to be better understood. For real-world problems, this means that
attempts to change the behaviour of groups or populations can be improved.
6.3
There are also some disadvantages to using social psychology theories, such as their high degree of
specification, which makes them difficult to understand for those who do not work in this field. Another
disadvantage is that each theory has a number of components and further developments that cannot be
taken into account by a given simulation in a complete and differentiated manner. These two aspects
make it difficult to crystallise the core statements from a theory and make it necessary to model these
theories in cooperation with an expert from the relevant field.
6.4
The advantages of modelling processes of social influence on the basis of social psychological theories
strongly outweigh the disadvantages. A large number of theories exist, and their use will bring great
benefit to the simulation while simultaneously advancing theoretical research.
6.5
The agent model may be extended, since an individual not only has processes "inside" that can be
explained by the elaboration likelihood of a topic. In the case of social influence, these processes may,
for example, include the theory of social comparison processes by Festinger (1954), the theory of
normative and informational influences (Deutsch and Gerard 1955), or the heuristic systematic model by
Chaiken (1980) (see also Mosler and Brucks 2001).
6.6
The group model can also be improved by using more than just five agents. A group of ten agents with a
minority of one to four members is definitely feasible and interesting. This could lead to more
information on the influence of the proportion of minority members on its success in persuading a
majority. As was shown in this paper, acceptance is higher when the minority has good arguments and
positive peripheral cues and when the minority is bigger, but its rejection is also more important when it
shows low argument quality and negative peripheral cues. In this light, it may be interesting to explore
the influence of size further. Since the order of influence may have led to some artefacts, a random
interaction pattern could be advantageous.07/01/2006 10:29 PM Hans-Joachim Mosler: Better Be Convincing or Better Be Stylish?
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 Concluding Remarks
7.1
The fact that simulation models are sometimes able to reproduce reality without actually allowing any
interpretation that is close to the problem studied is an often-criticised aspect of these models. Social
psychology and its theories can help to improve this weakness in simulation models concerned with
human behaviour and interaction. Such theories are generally based on observable facts and have been
widely tested in various settings with human participants. They therefore provide a solid basis for
modelling human behaviour.
7.2
Simulations allow new hypotheses to be set up for social psychology theories, which then need to be
tested in real-life experiments. A simulation permits the exploration of situations that would often be
too complicated or extensive to realise in the laboratory and therefore gives the researcher a clear
advantage. Fruitful hypotheses have been generated by using a simulation model for the optimum
design of campaigns to change ecologically relevant behaviour among the public, for example (e.g.
Mosler, Ammann, & Gutscher 1998). A well-presented, comprehensible and valid computer simulation
provides a useful impetus and tool for theory development and application in a manner that is
exploratory as long as it is well founded in model and theory.
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